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Abstrat
Two sellers engage in prie ompetition to attrat buyers loated on a net-
work. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number
of neighbors on the network who onsume the same good. For a generi spei-
ation of onsumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium prie equals
the marginal ost if and only if the buyer network is omplete or yli. When
the externalities are approximately linear in the size of onsumption, we iden-
tify the lass of networks in whih one of the sellers monopolizes the market,
or the two sellers segment the market.
Key words: graphs, networks, externalities, Bertrand, divide and onquer, dis-
riminatory priing, monopolization, segmentation, two-sided market.
Journal of Eonomi Literature Classiation Numbers: C72, D82.
1 Introdution
Goods have network externalities when their value to eah onsumer depends on
the onsumption deisions of other onsumers. The externalities may derive from
physial onnetion to onsumers adopting the same good as in the ase of teleom-
muniation devies, from provision of omplementary goods as in the ase of oper-
ating systems and softwares for omputers, or from pure psyhologial fators as in
the ase of onsumption bandwagon. Despite their importane in reality, we only
have limited understanding of network externalities partiularly when those goods
are supplied ompetitively. The objetive of this paper is to study prie ompeti-
tion in the presene of onsumption externalities represented by a buyer network.

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Speially, we formulate a model of prie ompetition under loal network external-
ities by supposing that two sellers ompete for a network of buyers who experiene
externalities when their neighbors in the network onsume the same good.
A more detailed desription of our model is as follows: Two sellers eah sell
goods that are inompatible with eah other. Consumers of either good experiene
larger positive externalities when more of his neighbors in the network onsume the
same good. In stage 1, the two sellers post pries simultaneously. The pries an
be perfetly disriminatory and an be negative. Upon publily observing the prie
vetors posted by both sellers, the buyers in stage 2 simultaneously deide whih
good to buy or not to buy. The sellers have no ost of serving the market, and their
payos simply equal the sum of pries oered to the buyers who hoose to buy their
goods.
In this framework, we nd that the equilibrium outome of prie ompetition
subtly depends on the network struture. Our rst observation onerns the validity
of marginal ost priing. When no network externalities are present, it is lear that
the unique subgame perfet equilibrium of this game has both sellers oer zero to
all buyers. In the presene of externalities, however, we show that the marginal ost
priing is onsistent with equilibrium only if either the externalities are linear (in the
number of neighbors onsuming the same good), or the network is either a omplete
graph or a yle.
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In any other network, if the externalities generi, there exists no
equilibrium in whih either seller aptures the entire market by oering the same
prie to all buyers. This is so even in networks where all buyers have symmetri
loations. Given this surprising result, we attempt to identify equilibrium pries
under non-linear externalities.
Positive identiation of equilibrium pries is possible when the externalities are
lose to linear and when the network satises ertain properties as follows. First, we
onsider bipartite networks. A network is bipartite if the set of buyers an be divided
into two subsets suh that for every buyer in either subset, all his neighbors belong
to the other subset. This is an important lass of networks given that it orresponds
to a two-sided market that has reeived muh attention in the literature as disussed
in the next setion. We show that in a bipartite network, there exists an equilibrium
in whih one of the sellers aptures the entire market (i.e., buyers on both sides) by
harging positive pries to all buyers on one side while subsidizing all buyers on the
1
A graph is omplete if any pair of buyers are neighbors. The linear externalities in partiular
imply that the value of the good is zero to a buyer when none of his neighbors onsumes it.
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other side.
Next, we identify the lass of networks for whih market segmentation takes plae
in equilibrium. We say that a network is separable if the buyer set an be divided
into two subsets suh that every buyer in eah subset has at least as many neighbors
in the same subset as in the other subset, and some buyer in eah subset has stritly
more neighbors in the same subset than in the other subset. In a separable network,
we show that market segmentation takes plae in equilibriumwith eah seller making
stritly positive prots.
The paper is organized as follows: After disussing the related literature in the
next setion, we formulate a model of prie ompetition in Setion 3. Setion 4 on-
siders the subgame played by the buyers that follows the publi observation of pries
posted by both sellers. The ritial observations there are that this simultaneous-
move game is one of strategi omplementarity, and hene that there exist maximal
and minimal Nash equilibria in eah subgame. We present an algorithm to obtain
these extreme equilibria and use them in our onstrution of a subgame perfet equi-
librium of the entire game. We begin the analysis of a subgame perfet equilibrium
in Setion 5 and identify lower bounds on the sellers' payo in suh equilibrium.
Setion 6 examines the validity of marginal ost priing in equilibrium. With the
denition of approximate linearity, Setion 7 disusses equilibrium in a bipartite
network, whih orresponds to a model of two-sided markets. Equilibrium market
segmentation in separable networks is disussed in Setion 8. We onlude in Se-
tion 9. All the proofs are olleted in the Appendix. The Appendix also ontains an
analysis of the game when the buyers oordinate their ations by playing a strong
Nash equilibrium in the stage 2 subgame.
2 Related Literature
Dybvig and Spatt (1983) are the rst to theoretially study the provision of goods
with network externalities.
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The problems of a single supplier of a good with network
externalities are subsequently studied by Cabral et al. (1999), Park (2004), Sekiguhi
(2009), Ohs and Park (2010), Aoyagi (2013), among others. These papers fous on
suh issues as the onstrution of eÆient or revenue maximizing adoption shemes
under omplete and inomplete information, intertemporal patterns of adoption
deisions, as well as the validity of introdutory priing.
2
Rohlfs (1974) provides a very early disussion of network externalities.
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Segal (2003), Winter (2004) and Bernstein and Winter (2012) study a losely
related problem of ontrating under externalities in whih a single prinipal oers
a ontrat to the set of agents whose partiipation deisions reate externalities to
other agents. They disuss the so-alled divide-and-onquer strategy used by the
prinipal: Aording to the strategy, the prinipal approahes agents one by one
in some order. The ontrat oered to the rst agent indues him to partiipate
even if all other agents abstain. The ontrat oered to the seond agent indues
him to partiipate if all but the rst agent abstain, and so on. In our analysis
of an equilibrium, we use exatly the same argument: Given some prie prole,
we examine if it is protable for either seller to approah the buyers one by one
in some order with pries that indue them to hoose the buyer provided that all
their predeessors do the same. We note that the argument is essentially that of
iterative elimination of stritly dominated strategies, and show that it an be used
very eetively to examine if the given prie prole is part of an equilibrium.
Competition between suppliers of goods with network externalities was rst for-
mulated by Katz and Shapiro (1985), and subsequently studied by Sundararajan
(2003), Ambrus and Argenziano (2009), Bernaji and Dutta (2009), and Jullien
(2011). These models are often ouhed in terms of two-sided markets, where the
sellers are providers of platforms who oer a marketplae for agents on two sides
suh as sellers and buyers of some good. In suh models, the utility of an agent on
one side is an inreasing funtion of the number of partiipants from the other side.
3
Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) analyze Bertrand ompetition between platforms in
a two-sided market. Jullien (2011) applies the divide-and-onquer argument to his
analysis of multi-sided markets, and derives a bound on the platforms' payos when
they engage in Stakelberg prie ompetition. Both Ambrus and Argenziano (2009)
and Jullien (2011) formulate externalities dierently from the present paper, and
impose some non-trivial restritions on the agents' strategies. Although these re-
stritions may appear natural under some prie proles, their full impliations are
not immediately lear. In ontrast, our analysis of a subgame perfet equilibrium
imposes no restrition on the buyers' strategies.
To the best of our knowledge, Banerji and Dutta (2009) are the only other paper
that introdues graph struture into a model of prie ompetition under network
externalities. They identify onditions under whih prie ompetition leads to mo-
nopolization and market segmentation. They assume, however, that eah seller sets
3
See Armstrong (1998), and Laont et al. (1998a,b).
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the same prie for all buyers and also plae restritions on the buyers' strategies. Be-
ause of these dierenes in assumptions, their onlusions are diÆult to ompare
with ours.
3 Model
Two sellers A and B ompete for the set I = f1; : : : ; Ng of N  3 buyers. Con-
sumption of either seller's good generates externalities to the buyers aording to
a buyer network. Formally, a buyer network is represented by a simple undireted
graph G whose nodes orrespond to the buyers, and onsumption externalities exist
between buyers i and j if they are adjaent in the sense that there is a link between
i and j. When buyer j is adjaent to buyer i, we also say that j is i's neighbor.
The buyer network G is onneted in the sense that for any pair of buyers i and
j, there exists a path from i to j. That is, there exist buyers i
1
; i
2
; : : : ; i
m
, suh
that i
1
is adjaent to i, i
2
is adjaent to i
1
, . . . , and i
m
is adjaent to j. For any
buyer i in network G, denote by N
i
(G) (or simply N
i
) the set of i's neighbors in G.
The degree d
i
(G) = jN
i
(G)j of buyer i in network G is the number of i's neighbors.
Dene also M to be the number of links in G. Sine eah link ounts twie when
aggregating the number of degrees in G, we have M =
1
2
P
i2I
d
i
.
For r = 2; : : : ; N   1, the network G is r-regular if all buyers have the same
degree r, and regular if it is r-regular for some r. G is yli if it is onneted and
2-regular, and omplete if it is (N   1)-regular, or equivalently, every pair of buyers
are adjaent to eah other. For any non-empty subset J  I of buyers, denote by
G[J ℄ the subnetwork indued from G: The set of nodes in G[J ℄ is J , and G[J ℄ has
a link between i 2 J and j 2 J if and only if i and j are adjaent in the original
network G.
The value of either seller's good to any buyer i is determined by the number of
neighbors of i who onsume the same good. We denote by v
n
the value of either good
to any onsumer when n of his neighbors onsume the same good. In partiular, v
0
denotes the stand-alone value, or the value to any buyer of either good when none of
his neighbors onsumes the same good. The value does not depend on the identity
of a buyer or the identity of the seller who supplies the good. The onsumption
externalities are non-negative in the sense that 0  v
0
 v
1
     v
N 1
.
Eah seller produes his good at no xed ost and a onstant marginal ost. For
simpliity, assume that the marginal osts also equals zero. Let p
i
and q
i
denote
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the pries oered to buyer i by seller A and seller B, respetively. The sellers an
perfetly prie disriminate the buyers. They simultaneously quote prie vetors
p = (p
i
)
i2I
2 R
N
and q = (q
i
)
i2I
2 R
N
. The buyers publily observe (p; q), and
then simultaneously deide whether to buy from either seller, or not buy. Buyer i's
ation x
i
is hene an element of the set fA;B; ;g, where ; represents no purhase.
Eah seller's strategy is hene an element of R
N
, whereas buyer i's strategy 
i
is a
mapping from the setR
2N
of prie vetors (p; q) to the set fA;B; ;g. Let  = (
i
)
i2I
be the buyers' strategy prole, and for eah hoie prole x = (x
i
)
i2I
of buyers, let
I
A
(x) = fi 2 I : x
i
= Ag; and I
B
(x) = fi 2 I : x
i
= Bg
denote the set of buyers hoosing seller A and the set of buyers hoosing B, respe-
tively. If we denote by 
A
(p; q; ) and 
B
(p; q; ) the payos of sellers A and B,
respetively, under the strategy prole (p; q; ), then they are given by

A
(p; q; ) =
X
i2I
A
((p;q))
p
i
;

B
(p; q; ) =
X
i2I
B
((p;q))
q
i
:
Given the prie prole (p; q), buyer i's payo under the ation prole x depends on
the number of his neighbors who onsume the same good, i.e.,
u
i
(x) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
v
jN
i
\I
A
(x)j
  p
i
if x
i
= A,
v
jN
i
\I
B
(x)j
  q
i
if x
i
= B,
0 if x
i
= ;,
(1)
and buyer i's payo under the strategy prole (p; q; ) is written as:

i
(p; q; ) = u
i
((p; q)):
A prie vetor (p

; q

) and a strategy prole  = (
i
)
i2I
together onstitute a
subgame perfet equilibrium (SPE) if given any prie vetor (p; q) 2 R
2N
, the ation
vetor (
i
(p; q))
i2I
is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame following (p; q), and given
, eah omponent of the prie vetor (p

; q

) is optimal against the other:

i
(p; q; (p; q))  
i
(p; q; x
i
; 
 i
(p; q)) for every x
i
, i and (p; q),

A
(p

; q

; (p

; q

))  
A
(p; q

; (p; q

)) for every p,

B
(p

; q

; (p

; q

))  
B
(p

; q; (p

; q)) for every q.
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4 Nash Equilibrium in the Buyers' Game
In this setion, we x the prie vetor (p; q), and onsider an equilibrium of the
buyers' subgame following (p; q). For the payo funtion u
i
dened in (1), the
simultaneous-move game (I; S = fA;B; ;g
I
; (u
i
)
i2I
) among the buyers is a super-
modular game when the set of ations of eah buyer is endowed with the ordering
A  ;  B. It follows that the game has pure Nash equilibria that are maximal
and minimal with respet to the partial ordering on S indued by .
4
We refer to
the maximal equilibrium as the A-maximal equilibrium and denote it by x
A
, and
the minimal equilibrium as the B-maximal equilibrium and denote it by x
B
. By
denition, for any NE y and buyer i, y
i
= A implies x
A
i
= A, and y
i
= B implies
x
B
i
= B.
We introdue some notation below in view of the fat that any NE must survive
the iterative elimination of stritly dominated ations.
Dene T
0
= ; and reursively dene the subsets of buyers Y
k
, Z
k
, P
k
, Q
k
, R
k
,
and T
k
as follows. For k = 0; 1; 2; : : :, dene Y
k+1
 I n T
k
to be the maximal set
suh that
Y
k+1
=
n
i 2 I n T
k
:
u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0
o
:
(2)
Given the ation prole x

T
k
of buyers in set T
k
, those buyers in Y
k+1
an olletively
hoose A to enjoy non-negative payos from it. In other words, if i =2 Y
k+1
, then
x
i
= A is stritly dominated by x
i
= ; for i. Note that maximality is well-dened
sine if Y and Y
0
both satisfy (2), then Y [ Y
0
also satises (2). If there is no suh
set, let Y
k+1
= ;. Likewise, dene Z
k+1
 I n T
k
to be the maximal set of buyers
who an olletively hoose B to enjoy non-negative payos from it:
Z
k+1
=
n
i 2 I n T
k
:
u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Z
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
k
 Z
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0
o
:
(3)
If there is no suh set, let Z
k+1
= ;. Again, if i =2 Z
k+1
, then x
i
= B is stritly
dominated by x
i
= ; for i. Dene
R
k+1
= (I n T
k
) n (Y
k+1
[ Z
k+1
)
4
See Topkis (1998).
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to be the set of buyers i for whom x
i
= ; is stritly dominant. Now dene P
k+1

I n T
k
by
P
k+1
=
n
i 2 I n T
k
: u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
i
= B; x
 T
k
 i
= (;; : : : ; ;)

> u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

o
;
(4)
That is, if i 2 P
n+1
, buyer i is stritly better o hoosing x
i
= B than hoosing
x
i
= A or ; even if seller A attrats all those buyers j for whom x
j
= A is not
stritly dominated by x
i
= ;. In other words, if i 2 P
k+1
, then x
i
= B is stritly
dominant for i. Likewise, dene Q
k+1
 I n T
k
to be the set of buyers i for whom
x
i
= A is stritly dominant:
Q
k+1
=
n
i 2 I n T
k
:u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
i
= A; x
 T
k
 i
= (;; : : : ; ;)

> u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Z
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
k
 Z
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

o
:
(5)
1) If P
k+1
= Q
k+1
= R
k+1
= ;, then set K = k and stop.
2) Otherwise, dene
x

i
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
B if i 2 P
k+1
,
A if i 2 Q
k+1
,
; if i 2 R
k+1
.
and
T
k+1
= T
k
[ (P
k+1
[Q
k+1
[R
k+1
) :
If T
k+1
= I, then set K = k + 1 and stop. Otherwise, inrease k by one and
start over.
Sine the above proess starts over only when at least one buyer has a stritly
dominant ation, the maximal number of rounds K must satisfy K  N . For any
NE x, we must have every buyer in T
K
hoosing his iteratively stritly dominant
ation so that
x
T
K
= x

T
K
:
Therefore the possible dierene between any pair of NE arises only for buyers in
I n T
K
. The following proposition states that the A-maximal and B-maximal NE
an be onstruted by letting the maximal number of buyers hoose A or B among
those buyers.
8
Proposition 1 Let x
A
and x
B
be dened by
x
A
= (x

T
K
; x
Y
K+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
K
 Y
K+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)); and
x
B
= (x

T
K
; x
Z
K+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
K
 Z
K+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)):
Then x
A
and x
B
are the A-maximal and B-maximal NE, respetively.
Of ourse, when T
K
= I so that every buyer has a iteratively stritly dominant
ation, the NE is unique and given by x
A
= x
B
.
5 Subgame Perfet Equilibrium
We now turn to the original two-stage game inluding the sellers. The proposition
below makes a simple observation that if a prie vetor (p

; q

) is sustained in some
SPE, then it must be sustained in an SPE in whih the buyers hoose an extreme
response to either seller's deviation: If seller A deviates from p

, then all buyers
oordinate on the B-maximal NE that least favors seller A, and vie versa. The
proposition hene presents a bang-bang property of an SPE.
Proposition 2 For any network G, (p

; q

) is an SPE prie vetor if and only if
there exists buyers' strategy prole  suh that (p

; q

; ) is an SPE and
(p; q) =
8
<
:

B
(p; q) if p 6= p

and q = q

,

A
(p; q) if p = p

and q 6= q

.
Consider next seller A's best response p to B's prie q when the buyers play the
B-maximal strategy 
B
. Sine 
B
(p; q) is a B-maximal NE for any (p; q), seller A
an attrat buyer i if and only if x
i
= A is an iteratively stritly dominant ation
for buyer i: i 2 [
K
k=1
Q
k
, where Q
k
is as dened in (5). Hene,

A
(p; q:
B
) =
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
p
i
:
The following lemma shows that if seller A's prie vetor p is a best response to
(q; 
B
), then no two buyers inQ
k
dened under (p; q) are adjaent. In other words, in
order to attrat adjaent buyers i and j, seller A should approah them sequentially.
Intuitively, this is beause making hoie A dominant for both buyers simultaneously
9
requires oering lower pries to both of them than making x
i
= A dominant for buyer
i rst, then making x
j
= A dominant for buyer j next onditional on the knowledge
that i hooses x
i
= A.
Lemma 3 Let (Q
k
)
k=1;:::;K
be as dened in (5) under the prie vetor (p; q). If p
is a best response to (q; 
B
), then for every k = 1; : : : ;K,
i; j 2 Q
k
) i and j are not adjaent.
We now derive a key result that establishes a lower bound for eah seller's equi-
librium payo given the prie vetor of the other seller. As mentioned in the Intro-
dution, the argument is one of divide and onquer, where seller A, say, approahes
eah buyer sequentially aording to some ordered list, and presents them with a
prie whih makes the hoie A a dominant ation given all his predeessors in the
list hoose A.
Formally, x the prie q

of seller B, and suppose that the buyers hoose A
only when it is an iteratively stritly dominated ation. Suppose further that seller
A makes an ordered list of all buyers i
1
; : : : ; i
N
. Seller A rst targets buyer i
1
by
making it stritly dominant for him to hoose x
i
1
= A by oering a suÆiently low
prie. In fat, seller A needs to oer p
i
1
suh that
v
0
  p
i
1
> v
d
i
1
  q

i
1
and v
0
  p
i
1
> 0;
or equivalently
p
i
1
< min
n
v
0
  v
d
i
1
+ q

i
1
; v
0
o
to make x
i
1
= A stritly dominant. Let H
1
= fi
1
g. Seller A next targets buyer i
2
by making x
i
2
= A stritly dominant. In this ase, seller A must oer p
i
2
suh that
p
i
2
< min
n
v
s
i
2
  v
d
i
2
 s
i
2
+ q

i
2
; v
s
i
2
o
;
where s
i
2
= 1 if buyer i
2
is adjaent to i
1
, and = 0 otherwise. Let H
2
= fi
1
; i
2
g.
Proeeding iteratively, we see that against buyer i
k
, seller A must oer p
i
k
suh that
p
i
k
< min
n
v
s
i
k
  v
d
i
k
 s
i
k
+ q

i
k
; v
s
i
k
o
; (6)
where s
i
k
is the number of neighbors of i
k
in the set H
k 1
= fi
1
; : : : ; i
k 1
g. s
i
k
an
be thought of the externalities buyer i
k
an enjoy by hoosing A when those buyers
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in H
k 1
have already hosen A. On the other hand, d
i
  s
i
k
is the externalities i
k
an enjoy from B when those buyers in I nH
k 1
still hoose B. Note that for any
list i
1
; : : : ; i
N
of buyers,
N
X
k=1
s
i
k
=M;
where M is the total number of links in G. Dene S by
S =
n
s = (s
i
)
i2I
: s
i
1
= 0 and s
i
k
= jN
i
k
\ fi
1
; : : : ; i
k 1
gj for k  2
for some relabeling (i
1
; : : : ; i
N
) of buyers
o
:
(7)
Note that if s orresponds to the list i
1
; : : : ; i
N
, then d s = (d
i
 s
i
)
i2I
orresponds
to the reversed list i
N
; : : : ; i
1
. Hene, if s 2 S, then d   s 2 S as well. We also
observe that
H
k
 [
k
`=1
Q
`
;
where Q
k
is as dened in (5) and equals the set of buyers i for whom x
i
= A is
iteratively stritly dominant in round k of the iteration proess under the prie
prole (p; q

). Hene, even if the buyers play the B-maximal equilibrium 
B
that
least favors seller A, A an at least seure the payo implied by the pries in (6). We
hene have the following lemma that gives a lower bound for eah seller's equilibrium
payo.
Lemma 4 If (p

; q

; ) is an SPE, then

A
(p

; q

; )  max
s2S
N
X
i=1
min
n
v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i
+ q

i
; v
s
i
o
;

B
(p

; q

; )  max
s2S
N
X
i=1
min
n
v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i
+ p

i
; v
s
i
o
:
(8)
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the disussion for the line network of three buyers. In
Figure 1, seller A approahes the buyers in the order (i
1
; i
2
; i
3
) = (1; 3; 2) when seller
B oers q

= (q

1
; q

2
; q

3
): When buyers 1 and 3 swith to A, their valuation of A's
good is just v
0
(stand-alone value) sine at that point they don't expet that buyer
2 will swith as well. On the other hand, when buyer 2 swithes to A, he knows that
both his neighbors will hoose A, and he expets that A's good is worth v
2
. Hene,
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v0
  p
1
> max fv
1
  q

1
; 0g
1
2
3
v
0
  p
3
> max fv
1
  q

3
; 0g
, p
1
< min fv
0
  v
1
+ q

1
; v
0
g
, p
3
< min fv
0
  v
1
+ q

3
; v
0
g
v
2
  p
2
> max fv
0
  q

2
; 0g
1
2
3
, p
2
< min fv
2
  v
0
+ q

2
; v
2
g
)
Figure 1: Divide-and-onquer by seller A with (i
1
; i
2
; i
3
) = (1; 3; 2).
v
1
  p
1
> max fv
0
  q

1
; 0g
1
2
3 v
1
  p
3
> max fv
0
  q

3
; 0g
, p
1
< minfv
1
  v
0
+ q

1
; v
1
g
, p
3
< minfv
1
  v
0
+ q

3
; v
1
g
v
0
  p
2
> max fv
2
  q

2
; 0g
1
2
3
, p
2
< min fv
0
  v
2
+ q

2
; v
0
g
)
Figure 2: Divide-and-onquer by seller A with (i
1
; i
2
; i
3
) = (2; 1; 3).
even if the buyers play the B-maximal equilibrium 
B
, seller A's divide-and-onquer
strategy with (i
1
; i
2
; i
3
) = (1; 3; 2) is protable if
minfv
0
  v
1
+ q

1
; v
0
g+minfv
0
  v
1
+ q

3
; v
0
g
+minfv
2
  v
0
+ q

2
; v
2
g > 0:
(9)
Likewise, his divide-and-onquer strategy with (i
1
; i
2
; i
3
) = (2; 1; 3) illustrated in
Figure 2 is protable if
minfv
0
  v
2
+ q

2
; v
0
g+minfv
1
  v
0
+ q

1
; v
1
g
+minfv
1
  v
0
+ q

3
; v
1
g > 0;
(10)
and that with (i
1
; i
2
; i
3
) = (1; 2; 3) is protable if
minfv
0
  v
1
+ q

1
; v
0
g+minfv
1
  v
1
+ q

2
; v
1
g
+minfv
1
  v
0
+ q

3
; v
1
g > 0:
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6 Marginal Cost Priing
When there are no onsumption externalities 0 < v
0
=    = v
N 1
, it is lear that
a subgame perfet equilibrium prie (p

; q

) is unique and equal to the marginal
ost: (p

; q

) = (0; 0). In this setion, we will examine if and how this result an be
extended when there are externalities.
Let D = D(G) be the highest degree in G:
D(G) = max
i2I
d
i
(G):
For the network G, hene, the relevant levels of externalities are (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
). We
say that the externalities (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
) are linear if there exists h > 0 suh that
v
k
= kh for every k = 0; 1; : : : ;D.
Note in partiular that the stand-alone value v
0
is zero when the externalities are
linear. In this sense, linearity implies pure network externalities and violates the
formulation of weak externalities in Jullien (2011).
5
Proposition 5 Let G be an arbitrary buyer network. Under the linear externalities
(v
0
; : : : ; v
D
), (p

; q

) = (0; 0) is an SPE prie vetor.
We next onsider some generi property of externalities. As will be seen, whether
or not the marginal ost an be an equilibrium prie depends ruially on the ong-
uration of the buyer network in this ase. Speially, for S dened in (7), suppose
that the externalities (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
) satisfy the following ondition:
s 2 S and d  s is not a permutation of s )
N
X
i=1
v
s
i
6=
N
X
i=1
v
d
i
 s
i
. (11)
(11) implies that the sum of externalities over buyers are dierent between the two
goods when seller A attrats buyers by oering pries as desribed in (6). The set
of (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
) satisfying (11) is generi in the set

(v
0
; : : : ; v
D
) : 0 < v
0
     v
D
	
of all externalities.
5
Assumption 1 of Jullien (2011).
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Lemma 4 implies that a seller's equilibrium payo is losely linked to the value
of
max
s2S
N
X
i=1

v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i

:
It turns out that whether this quantity is positive or not under (11) depends ruially
on the network onguration as seen in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Suppose that the externalities v = (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
) satisfy (11). If the buyer
network G is neither yli nor omplete, then
max
s2S
N
X
i=1

v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i

> 0: (12)
The following lemma, whih readily follows from Lemmas 4 and 6, provides some
key observations on equilibrium priing.
Lemma 7 Suppose that (p

; q

; ) is an SPE for the buyer network G whih is
neither omplete nor yli, and that the externalities v = (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
) satisfy (11).
Then
a) 
A
(p

; q

; ) = 0 ) min
i
q

i
< 0.
b) 
A
(p

; q

; ) 
P
i
q

i
) max
i
q

i
> v
0
.
) I
B
((p

; q

)) = I ) max
i
q

i
> v
0
, min
i
(v
d
i
  q

i
)  v
0
, and v
D
> 2v
0
.
While the rst two statements of Lemma 7 are true regardless of whether the
market is monopolized or segmented in equilibrium, the impliations of the lemma
are seen most learly for a monopolization equilibrium. Suppose that G is neither
yli nor omplete, and that seller B aptures the entire market in equilibrium:
I
B
((p

; q

)) = I. Then seller B must subsidize at least one buyer, and must harge
some buyer stritly above the stand-alone value:
min
i
q

i
< 0  v
0
< max
i
q

i
< v
D
  v
0
:
Furthermore, for any suh equilibrium to exist, the externalities annot be too small:
v
D
> 2v
0
. This is a non-trivial restrition for networks in whih every buyer has a
small degree as in line networks. We summarize this observation as a proposition
below.
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Proposition 8 Let a buyer network G be given and the externalities v = (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
)
satisfy (11). Then there exists no SPE in whih one of the sellers monopolizes the
market by harging the same prie to every buyer.
The impossibility of uniform priing is ounter-intuitive in networks whih are
not yli or omplete, but are symmetri with respet to every buyer. For example,
buyer loations are exatly symmetri in the 4-regular network depited in Figure
3.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Figure 3: 4-regular network with eight buyers
We are now ready to state our main result on marginal ost priing. Suppose
that both sellers oer zero to all the buyers. In this ase, both sellers' payos equal
zero regardless of whether or not they apture a positive portion of the market.
Hene, this prie prole annot be an equilibrium by Lemma 7(a) unless the network
is omplete or yli. The following proposition shows that when the network is
omplete or yli, there indeed exists an SPE of the type presented in Proposition
2 in whih both sellers oer zero.
Proposition 9 Let a buyer network G be given and the externalities v = (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
)
satisfy (11). (p

; q

) = (0; 0) is an SPE prie vetor if and only if G is either yli
or omplete.
For illustration of the impossibility of marginal ost priing, return to the ex-
ample of the three-buyer line network depited in Figures 1 and 2. Suppose that
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q
= 0. In this ase, we have
(9) , 2v
1
  v
2
  v
0
< 0;
(10) , 2v
1
  v
2
  v
0
> 0:
Hene, if
2v
1
6= v
2
+ v
0
; (13)
seller A an protably divide and onquer the buyers against q

= 0. Note that
(13) orresponds to (12) in Lemma 6: It fails under the linear externalities v
0
= 0,
v
1
= h and v
2
= 2h, but is true under generi speiations of v
0
, v
1
and v
2
.
7 Monopolization on a Bipartite Network
The results in the preeding setion suggest that some form of disriminatory priing
is inevitable in equilibrium. A natural question then is on the form of equilibrium
prie disrimination. Interesting related questions are (1) whih buyers are the
\weak link" in the network that need to be proteted, and (2) whih buyers an
be squeezed for more prots. Sine it appears diÆult to provide general answers
to these questions, we will restrit attention to ertain lasses of networks for the
identiation of an equilibrium. In this setion, we identify a lass of networks in
whih monopolization takes plae in equilibrium.
Our analysis in what follows assumes that the externalities are approximately
linear in the following sense: For h > 0, the externalities (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
) are "-lose to
linear if
jv
k
  khj < " for k = 0; 1; : : : ;D.
Sine the ondition holds for any " > 0 when the externalities are exatly linear,
our onlusions under approximate linearity hold with no hange in models of linear
externalities. In onjuntion with Proposition 5, then, this implies the multipliity
of equilibria in these markets.
The buyer network is bipartite if the buyer set I is partitioned into two disjoint
subsets I
1
and I
2
suh that every neighbor of i 2 I
1
belongs to I
2
and every neighbor
of i 2 I
2
belongs to I
1
. Line and star networks are simple examples of a bipartite
network. For example, the line network in Figures 1 and 2 is bipartite with the
partition I
1
= f1; 3g and I
2
= f2g. A yle network with an even number of buyers
is also bipartite. A bipartite network is omplete if every buyer in I
1
is linked to
every buyer in I
2
.
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Bipartite networks are partiularly important in their onnetion to two-sided
markets. For example, we an think of I
1
as the set of sellers and I
2
as the set of
buyers of a ertain good. In this ase, the sellers A and B are interpreted as the
platforms that oer marketplae to these sellers and buyers, and their pries are
interpreted as partiipation fees into their platforms. A omplete bipartite network
orresponds to a two-sided market in whih eah agent nds more value in a given
platform whenever more agents on the other side partiipate in the same platform.
Our onlusion on a bipartite network translates to that on a two-sided market
where two platforms ompete.
Proposition 10 Suppose that the buyer network G is bipartite. For any h > 0,
there exists " > 0 suh that if the externalities are "-lose to h-linear for " < ", then
there exists an SPE (p

; q

; ) in whih one seller aptures all the buyers.
The equilibrium onstruted in the proof is desribed as follows: Let I
1
and I
2
be the partition of the buyer set, and suppose that seller B aptures the market.
Seller B oers q
i
= v
d
i
  v
0
to eah buyer i in set I
1
and q
i
= v
0
  v
d
i
to eah
buyer i in set I
2
provided that these pries lead to a non-negative payo.
6
In other
words, the monopolizing seller taxes every buyer on one side, and subsidizes every
buyer on the other side. Seller A oers the same prie to eah buyer as seller B.
When either seller deviates, the buyers play the extreme equilibrium whih is least
favorable to the deviating seller as in Proposition 2. It is shown that this prie vetor
leaves no room for seller A to protably attrat any buyers. Figure 4 illustrates the
equilibrium priing of Proposition 10 in a star network with ve buyers when the
externalities satisfy approximate linearity and
v
4
  v
0
 4(v
1
  v
0
): (14)
It an be seen that the hub buyer 1 is harged a positive prie whereas all the
peripheral buyers are subsidized. In other words, the subsidies to the peripheral
buyers are a protetion against the induement by the other seller. Sine (14) holds
when the externalities are marginally inreasing, we an understand this priing
behavior from the fat that it is relatively more diÆult for the other seller to entie
the hub buyer. When the inequality (14) is reversed, then the pries are ( 1) times
those listed in Figure 4. In this ase of marginally dereasing externalities, hene,
6
Reall that d
i
denotes the degree of buyer i. If these pries lead to a negative payo, the
equilibrium pries are simply  q
i
for eah i.
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the hub buyer needs to be proteted as it is relatively easier for the other seller to
entie him. As seen in this example, the speiation of externalities determines
whih buyer(s) should be proteted with subsidies.
2
3
4
5
1
p
1
= q
1
= v
4
  v
0
p
2
= q
2
= v
0
  v
1
p
3
= q
3
= v
0
  v
1
p
4
= q
4
= v
0
  v
1
p
5
= q
5
= v
0
  v
1
Figure 4: Monopolization through disriminatory priing on a star network when
v
4
  v
0
 4(v
1
  v
0
).
Dereasing or inreasing marginal externalities also have the following implia-
tions for the priing in a omplete bipartite network: Under inreasing marginal
externalities, any buyer in a omplete bipartite network is subsidized in equilibrium
if and only if his subset of buyers is larger than the other subset. The opposite holds
under dereasing marginal externalities.
Corollary 11 Suppose that the network is omplete bipartite with partition (I
1
; I
2
)
suh that jI
1
j  jI
2
j. For any h > 0, there exists " > 0 suh that the following hold
for " < ":
a) (inreasing marginal externalities) If
h  "  v
1
  v
0
 v
2
  v
1
     v
D
  v
D 1
 h+ ";
then there exists an SPE (p; q; ) suh that p
i
= q
i
> 0 for every i 2 I
1
and
p
i
= q
i
< 0 for every i 2 I
2
.
b) (dereasing marginal externalities) If
h  "  v
D
  v
D 1
     v
2
  v
1
 v
1
  v
0
 h+ ";
then there exists an SPE (p; q; ) suh that p
i
= q
i
< 0 for every i 2 I
1
and
p
i
= q
i
> 0 for every i 2 I
2
.
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8 Segmentation on a Separable Network
Under the same assumption of approximately linear externalities as in the previous
setion, we now examine the possibility of an equilibrium in whih market segmen-
tation takes plae. For this, we onsider a lass of buyer networks that have roughly
the opposite property as the bipartite networks introdued in the previous setion:
In this lass of networks, the buyer set is again partitioned into two disjoint subsets,
but eah buyer has at least as many neighbors in the same subset than in the other
subset. Formally, the buyer network is separable if there exists a two-way partition
(I
1
; I
2
) of the set I of buyers suh that for m, n = 1, 2, and m 6= n,
jN
i
\ I
n
j  jN
i
\ I
m
j for every i 2 I
n
, and
jN
i
\ I
n
j > jN
i
\ I
m
j for some i 2 I
n
.
Intuitively, in a separable network with partition (I
1
; I
2
), we an lassify buyers in
I
1
or I
2
into ore and peripheral buyers: The ore buyers are those who have stritly
more neighbors in the same set than in the other set, while the peripheral buyers
have as many neighbors in the same set as in the other set. We an see that any
line network with four or more buyers is separable: For example, a line network of
four or more buyers is separable. The regular network in Figure 3 is also separable
when we take I
1
= f1; 2; 3; 4g and I
2
= f5; 6; 7; 8g. Buyer 2 and 3 are ore buyers
for I
1
and buyers 6 and 7 are ore buyers for I
2
.
Proposition 12 Suppose that G is separable. For any h > 0, there exists " > 0
suh that if the externalities are "-lose to h-linear for " < ", there exists an SPE
in whih buyers in I
1
hoose seller A and buyers in I
2
hoose seller B.
The proof of this proposition onstruts an equilibrium in whih eah seller
harges a small but positive prie to one of the ore buyers in his segment of the
market. Speially, realling that s is a sequene of degrees of externalities as
dened in (7), we speify the prie to be harged to this ore buyer by
Æ = max
s2S
N
X
i=1

v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i

;
whih is stritly positive for generi externalities (Lemma 6), but is small for ap-
proximately linear externalities. Eah seller harges zero to all other buyers in their
segment of the market. Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium for a line network of four
19
23
4
1
(p
1
; q
1
) = (Æ; Æ)
(p
4
; q
4
) = ( Æ; Æ)
(p
2
; q
2
) = (0; 0) (p
3
; q
3
) = (0; 0)
Figure 5: Segmentation on a line network (Æ = jv
2
+ v
1
  2v
0
j > 0): A aptures
f1; 2g and B aptures f3; 4g.
buyers.
7
As in Proposition 2, any deviation by either seller results in the extreme
equilibrium that is least favorable to the deviating seller. Eah ore buyer who is
harged the positive prie will not swith to the other seller sine he enjoys stritly
higher externalities under the present seller. Furthermore, eah seller enjoys stritly
positive prots in equilibrium, and has no inentive to engage in divide-and-onquer
taking advantage of the non-generi externalities as in the ase of marginal ost
priing.
9 Conlusion
In this paper, we formulate a model of prie ompetition between two sellers when
eah one of their goods exhibits loal network externalities as represented by a graph-
theoreti network of buyers. We show that whether a given prie prole is onsistent
with a subgame perfet equilibrium of the two-stage game depends ruially on
the exat speiations of network struture and externalities. In the non-generi
ase of linear externalities, the marginal ost priing of both sellers quoting zero to
every buyer is onsistent with an SPE for any network. In the generi speiation
of externalities, however, it is onsistent with an SPE if and only if the network
is either yli or omplete. That is, in any other networks, some form of prie
disrimination is expeted even if every buyer has exatly symmetri loations in
those networks. Given these results, we proeed to the identiation of an SPE when
the externalities are approximately linear. In a bipartite network whih orresponds
to a two-sided market, we show that there exists an SPE in whih one of the sellers
monopolizes the market by harging a positive prie to every buyer on one side, and
a negative prie to every buyer on the other side. The priing strategy there gives
us a hint as to whih buyer needs to be proteted from the induement by the other
7
As seen in Figure 5, eah seller harges  Æ to the ore buyer in the other segment who is
harged Æ by the other seller. This is to make the sum of the pries of eah seller equal to zero.
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seller. In a separable network in whih eah buyer has more neighbors on his side
than on the other side, on the other hand, we show that there exists an equilibrium
in whih the two sellers segment the market.
In the present model, the goods of the two sellers are assumed symmetri and
inompatible with eah other. A natural extension would involve introduing asym-
metry or a positive degree of ompatibility between them. It would also be in-
teresting to study endogenous determination of ompatibility levels by the sellers.
Although some of these issues are investigated in the literature,
8
it will be useful to
examine them under the alternative speiations of externalities and equilibrium
as in the present paper.
Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that x
A
is an A-maximal NE. The symmetri
argument shows that x
B
is a B-maximal NE. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 13 a) u
i
(x
A
)  0 for every i.
b) For any n, fi 2 I n T
n
: x
A
i
= Ag  Y
n+1
and fi 2 I n T
n
: x
A
i
= Bg  Z
n+1
.
) For any n, J  I n T
n
, and y
J
suh that u
i
(y
J
; x
A
 J
)  0 for every i 2 J ,
fi 2 J : y
i
= Ag  Y
n+1
and fi 2 J : y
i
= Bg  Z
n+1
: (15)
Proof of Lemma 13. a) Suppose that i 2 P
n+1
for some n. Then
u
i
(x
A
) = u
i
(x
A
T
n
; x
i
= B; x
A
 T
n
 i
)
 u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
i
= B; x
 T
n
 i
= (;; : : : ; ;)

> u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A);X
 T
n
 Y
n+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0:
The proof is similar if i 2 Q
n+1
. If i 2 R
n+1
or i 2 I n T
n
for n suh that P
n+1
=
Q
n+1
= R
n+1
= ;, then the inequality follows from the denition of x
A
.
8
See Jullien (2011).
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b) Denote K = fi 2 I n T
n
: x
A
i
= Ag. Then for any i 2 K, we have
u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
K[Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 K Y
n+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
K
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 K
= (;; : : : ; ;)

= u
i
(x
A
)  0;
and for any i 2 Y
n+1
,
u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
K[Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 K Y
n+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 Y
n+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0:
This ontradits the maximality of Y
n+1
.
) Denote K = fi 2 J : y
i
= Ag. Suppose that K 6 Y
n+1
. Then for i 2 K,
u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
K[Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 Y
n+1
 K
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
J
; x
A
 T
n
 J

= u
i
(x
A
 J
; x
J
)
 0;
where the rst inequality follows from Lemma 13(b), and for any i 2 Y
n+1
,
u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
K[Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 Y
n+1
 K
= (;; : : : ; ;)

u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 Y
n+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0:
This again ontradits the maximality of Y
n+1
. 
We now return to the proof of Proposition 1.
1) x
A
is a NE.
Sine u
i
(x
A
)  0 by Lemma 13(a), x
0
i
= ; annot be a protable deviation for
any i, and moreover a protable deviation, if any, must yield a stritly positive
payo.
Take any i 2 P
n+1
so that x
A
i
= B, and onsider a deviation x
0
i
= A. If
u
i
(x
0
i
; x
A
 i
)  0, then i 2 Y
n+1
by Lemma 13() and hene
u
i
(x
0
i
; x
A
 i
)  u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 Y
n+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

< u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
A
i
; x
 T
n
 i
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
(x
A
):
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Hene the deviation is not protable. Likewise, no protable deviation exists for
i 2 Q
n+1
. Suppose next that i 2 R
n+1
so that x
A
i
= ;. x
0
i
= A is not protable
sine i 2 R
n+1
implies that i =2 Y
n+1
and hene u
i
(x
0
i
; x
A
 i
) < 0 by Lemma 13().
Likewise, the deviation x
0
i
= B is not protable. Finally, suppose that i 2 I n T
n
and that P
n+1
= Q
n+1
= R
n+1
= ;. In this ase, x
A
i
= A if i 2 Y
n+1
and x
A
i
= ;
otherwise. If x
0
i
= B, then
u
i
(x
0
i
; x
A
 i
) = u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
0
i
; x
A
 T
n
 i

= u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
0
i
; x
 T
n
 i
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 Y
n+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

= u
i
(x
A
);
where the inequality follows sine i =2 P
n+1
. Hene, x
0
i
= B is not a protable
deviation. If i 2 I n T
n
n Y
n+1
and x
0
i
= A, then u
i
(x
0
i
; x
A
 i
) < 0 by Lemma 13().
2) x
A
is A-maximal.
Take any NE y. Clearly, u
i
(y)  0 for every i. We rst show that y
i
= x
A
i
if
i 2 T
1
. To see that y
i
= B for any i 2 P
1
, suppose y
i
= A. Then by setting n = 0
and J = I in Lemma 13(), we see that fi : y
i
= Ag  Y
1
so that
u
i
(y
i
; y
 i
)  u
i
(x
Y
1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 Y
1
= (;; : : : ; ;))
< u
i
(x
i
= B; x
 i
= (;; : : : ; ;))
 u
i
(x
i
= B; y
 i
);
where the seond inequality follows from the denition of P
1
. Hene x
i
= B is a
protable deviation. Likewise, y
i
= A holds for any i 2 Q
1
. If i 2 R
1
, then y
i
= ;
must hold sine i =2 Y
1
[ Z
1
.
As an indution hypothesis, suppose that y
i
= x
A
i
if i 2 T
n
. We show that
y
i
= x
A
i
if i 2 T
n+1
n T
n
. If i 2 P
n+1
, then y
i
= B: If y
i
= A, then fi 2 I n T
n
: y
i
=
Ag  Y
n+1
by Lemma 13() (set J = I n T
n
) so that
u
i
(y
i
; y
 i
)  u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
Y
n+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
n
 Y
n+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

< u
i
 
x
A
T
n
; x
i
= B; x
 T
n
 i
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
(x
i
= B; y
 i
);
where the seond inequality follows from the denition of P
n+1
. Hene x
i
= B is a
protable deviation. Likewise, y
i
= A for any i 2 Q
n+1
. If i 2 R
n+1
, then y
i
= ;
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must hold sine i =2 Y
n+1
[Z
n+1
. Finally, if i 2 I nT
n
and P
n+1
= Q
n+1
= R
n+1
= ;,
then y
i
= A implies i 2 Y
n+1
by Lemma 13(), but x
A
i
= A for any suh i by
denition. We an therefore onlude that x
A
is an A-maximal NE. 
Proof of Proposition 2. If there exists suh a strategy prole  of buyers, then
(p

; q

) is learly an SPE prie vetor. Conversely, suppose that (p

; q

) is an SPE
prie vetor. Then there exists ^ suh that (p

; q

; ^) is an SPE. Dene  as follows:
(p; q) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
^(p; q) if (p; q) = (p

; q

), or p 6= p

and q 6= q

,

A
(p; q) if p = p

and q 6= q

,

B
(p; q) if p 6= p

and q = q

.
Then (p

; q

; ) is an SPE: The denition of 
B
and the equilibrium property of ^
together imply

A
(p; q

; )  
A
(p; q

; ^)  
A
(p

; q

; ^) = 
A
(p

; q

; ):
Likewise, the denition of 
A
and the equilibrium property of ^ together imply

B
(p

; q; )  
B
(p

; q

; ). 
Proof of Lemma 3. For simpliity, let k = K and suppose to the ontrary that
1, 2 2 Q
K
and 1 and 2 are adjaent. Then it must be the ase that
v

K
1
  p
1
> max fv
d
1
 
K
1
  q
1
; 0g and v

K
2
  p
2
> max fv
d
2
 
K
2
  q
2
; 0g;
where

K
1
=



N
1
\ [
K 1
`=1
Q
`



; and 
K
2
=



N
2
\ [
K 1
`=1
Q
`



are the numbers of neighbors of 1 and 2, respetively, for whom x
i
is iteratively
stritly dominant in round K   1 or earlier. Hene,
p
1
< v

K
1
 max fv
d
1
 
K
1
  q
1
; 0g and p
2
< v

K
2
 max fv
d
2
 
K
2
  q
2
; 0g:
On the other hand, let p
0
be suh that p
0
i
= p
i
for i 6= 2, and
p
2
< p
0
2
< v

K
2
+1
 max fv
d
2
 
K
2
 1
  q
2
; 0g:
Denote by Q
0
k
the set of buyers for whom x
1
= A is an iteratively dominant ation in
round k under (p
0
; q) as dened in (5). We then have Q
0
k
= Q
k
for k = 1; : : : ;K   1
and Q
0
K
= Q
K
[ f1g so that 
K
2
+ 1 of 2's neighbors have hosen A in round K or
earlier. Sine
v

K
2
+1
  p
0
2
> max fv
d
2
 
K
2
 1
  q
2
; 0g;
Q
0
K+1
= f2g. Furthermore, sine p
0
2
> p
2
, 
A
(p
0
; q; 
B
) > 
A
(p; q; 
B
). 
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Proof of Lemma 4. Fix any relabeling of buyers i
1
; : : : ; i
N
. Let s = (s
i
)
i2I
be
dened by
s
i
1
= 0 and s
i
k
= jN
i
k
\ fi
1
; : : : ; i
k 1
gj for k = 2; : : : ; N .
Let " > 0 be given, and dene the prie vetor p = (p
i
)
i2I
by
p
i
= min fv
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i
+ q

i
; v
s
i
g   ": (16)
As explained in the text, by oering p, seller A makes x
i
1
= A a stritly dominant
ation for buyer i
1
, and in any subsequent step, x
i
k
= A an iteratively stritly
dominant ation for buyer i
k
under (p; q

). Hene, seller A's payo under (p; q

; )
satises

A
(p; q

; ) 
N
X
i=1
minfv
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i
+ q

i
; v
s
i
g  N":
Sine " > 0 and s 2 S are arbitrary, if (8) does not hold, then we would have a
ontradition

A
(p; q

; ) > 
A
(p

; q

; ):
The symmetri argument proves the inequality for seller B's payo. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We rst show that (p

; q

) = (0; 0) is an SPE prie. Let

A
and 
B
be the A-maximal and B-maximal equilibria as dened earlier, and let
 be the buyers' strategy prole suh that
(p; q) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
(B; : : : ; B) if (p; q) = (0; 0),

B
(p; q) if p 6= 0 and q = 0,

A
(p; q) if p = 0 and q 6= 0.
Now onsider a deviation from p

= 0 to p 6= 0 by seller A. Let Q
k
(k = 1; : : : ;K)
be as dened in (5) under (p; q

). It then follows that
I
A
(
A
(p; q

)) = [
K
k=1
Q
k
for some K  N . In other words, any buyer attrated by seller A with p must
hoose A as his iteratively stritly dominant ation. Hene, seller A's payo under
(p; q

; ) an be written as:

A
(p; q

; ) =
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
p
i
: (17)
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Now let

k
i
=



N
i
\ [
k 1
`=1
Q
`



denote the number of neighbors of buyer i who have already hosen seller A in
rounds prior to k. If i 2 Q
k
, then x
i
= A must be a dominant ation in round k for
buyer i so that
v

k
i
  p
i
> v
d
i
 
k
i
, p
i
< v

k
i
  v
d
i
 
k
i
: (18)
Note now that
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k

k
i
=
K
X
k=1

#links between Q
k
and [
k 1
`=1
Q
`

 #links in the subnetwork G

[
K
k=1
Q
k

=
1
2
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
d
i
 
G

[
K
k=1
Q
k


1
2
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
d
i
:
(19)
Substituting (18), (19) and the linearity of the externalities into (17), we obtain

A
(p; q

; ) <
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k

v

k
i
  v
d
i
 
k
i

= h
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k

2
k
i
  d
i

 0:
Therefore, the deviation p is not protable. By the symmetri argument, no devia-
tion q by seller B is protable either. 
Proof of Lemma 6. Note that (12) follows if we show that d   s is not a per-
mutation of s for some s: (11) implies that either
P
N
i=1
 
v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i

> 0 or < 0.
If the latter holds, then let i
0
k
= i
N k+1
for k = 1; : : : ; N and dene t = (t
i
)
i2I
by
setting t
i
0
k
equal to the number of neighbors of i
0
k
in fi
0
1
; : : : ; i
0
k 1
g:
t
i
0
1
= 0 and t
i
0
k
= jN
i
0
k
\ fi
0
1
; : : : ; i
0
k 1
gj for k = 2; : : : ; N . (20)
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Then we an verify that
N
X
i=1

v
t
i
  v
d
i
 t
i

=  
N
X
i=1

v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i

> 0:
We will onsider the following two ases separately.
1) G is not regular.
Take a pair of buyers i and j suh that i is adjaent to j, d
i
= D and d
j
< D,
where D  2 is the highest degree in G. Take another buyer k that is adjaent
to i but not to j. To see that there exists suh a buyer, suppose to the ontrary
that every buyer 6= j that is adjaent to i is also adjaent to j. Then j has at
least D neighbors, a ontradition. Let i
1
= k, i
2
= i and i
3
= j, and dene
i
4
; : : : ; i
N
=2 fi; j; kg arbitrarily. Then
(s
i
1
; s
i
2
; s
i
3
) = (0; 1; 1) ;
(d
i
1
  s
i
1
; d
i
2
  s
i
2
; d
i
3
  s
i
3
) = (d
k
;D   1; d
j
  1) :
If s is not a permutation of d   s, then we are done. Suppose then that s is a
permutation of d  s, and dene i
0
1
= k, i
0
2
= j, i
0
3
= i, and i
0
`
= i
`
for `  4, and let
t = (t
i
)
i2I
be dened by (20) for these i
0
1
; : : : ; i
0
N
. Then

t
i
0
1
; t
i
0
2
; t
i
0
3

= (0; 0; 2) ;

d
i
0
1
  t
i
0
1
; d
i
0
2
  t
i
0
2
; d
i
0
3
  t
i
0
3

= (d
k
; d
j
;D   2) :
Sine i
0
`
= i
`
for `  4, we have



n
`  4 : d
i
`
  s
i
`
= 0
o



=



n
`  4 : d
i
0
`
  t
i
0
`
= 0
o



;



n
`  4 : s
i
`
= 0
o



=



n
`  4 : t
i
0
`
= 0
o



:
(21)
a) d
j
= 1.
In this ase,



n
`  3 : d
i
`
  s
i
`
= 0
o



=



n
`  3 : s
i
`
= 0
o



= 1:
Hene, sine d  s is a permutation of s, we must have
jf`  4 : d
i
`
  s
i
`
= 0gj = jf`  4 : s
i
`
= 0gj :
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It then follows from (21) that



n
`  4 : d
i
0
`
  t
i
0
`
= 0
o



=



n
`  4 : t
i
0
`
= 0
o



: (22)
However,



n
`  3 : d
i
0
`
  t
i
0
`
= 0
o



 1 < 2 =



n
`  3 : t
i
0
`
= 0
o



: (23)
(22) and (23) together show that d  t annot be a permutation of t.
b) d
j
 2.
In this ase, we have D  3 sine D > d
j
 2, and also



n
`  3 : d
i
`
  s
i
`
= 0
o



= 0 < 1 =



n
`  3 : s
i
`
= 0
o



:
Hene, sine d  s is a permutation of s,
jf`  4 : d
i
`
  s
i
`
= 0gj = jf`  4 : s
i
`
= 0gj+ 1:
It then follows from (21) that



n
`  4 : d
i
0
`
  t
i
0
`
= 0
o



=



n
`  4 : t
i
0
`
= 0
o



+ 1: (24)
However,



n
`  3 : d
i
0
`
  t
i
0
`
= 0
o



=



n
`  3 : t
i
0
`
= 0
o



  2 (25)
(24) and (25) together imply that d  t is not a permutation of t.
2) G is r-regular with 2 < r < N   1.
Sine G is onneted and not omplete, we an take a pair of buyers i
1
and i
2
suh that i
1
and i
2
are adjaent, and take another buyer i
3
who is adjaent to i
2
but not to i
1
. To see that this is possible, suppose to the ontrary that for any
pair of adjaent buyers i and j, any buyer k 6= i adjaent to j is also adjaent to
i. We then show that G must be omplete. Take any pair of buyers i and j. Sine
G is onneted, there is a path k
1
= i ! k
2
!    ! k
m 1
! k
m
= j. Sine k
2
is
adjaent to i = k
1
and k
3
is adjaent to k
2
, k
3
is adjaent to i as well by the above.
Now sine k
4
is adjaent to k
3
, it is also adjaent to i. Proeeding the same way, we
onlude that j = k
m
is adjaent to i = k
1
, implying that G is omplete.
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We now label buyers other than fi
1
; i
2
; i
3
g as i
4
; : : : ; i
N
in an arbitrary manner.
For our hoie of i
1
, i
2
and i
3
, we have
(s
i
1
; s
i
2
; s
i
3
) = (0; 1; 1) ;
(d
i
1
  s
i
1
; d
i
2
  s
i
2
; d
i
3
  s
i
3
) = (r; r   1; r   1) :
If d   s is a not permutation of s, then we are done. Suppose then that d   s is a
permutation of s. We then must have



f` : s
i
`
= 0g



=



f` : d
i
`
  s
i
`
= 0g



: (26)
Let i
0
1
= i
1
, i
0
2
= i
3
, i
0
3
= i
2
and i
0
`
= i
`
for `  4, and let t = (t
i
)
i2I
be dened by
(20) for these i
0
1
; : : : ; i
0
N
. Note that

t
i
0
1
; t
i
0
2
; t
i
0
3

= (0; 0; 2) ;

d
i
0
1
  t
i
0
1
; d
i
0
2
  t
i
0
2
; d
i
0
3
  t
i
0
3

= (r; r; r   2) :
Sine r > 2, if (26) holds, then the same argument as in the non-regular ase shows
that



n
` : t
i
0
`
= 0
o



6=



n
` : d
i
0
`
  t
i
0
`
= 0
o



;
implying that d  t is not a permutation of t. 
Proof of Lemma 7. We rst show that if (p

; q

; ) is an SPE, then

A
(p

; q

; ) >
N
X
i=1
min fq

i
; v
0
g and 
B
(p

; q

; ) >
N
X
i=1
min fp

i
; v
0
g: (27)
By Lemma 4, for any s 2 S, seller A's payo under (p

; q

) satises

A
(p

; q

; ) 
N
X
i=1
minfv
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i
+ q

i
; v
s
i
g:
Rearranging, we get for any s 2 S,

A
(p

; q

; ) 
N
X
i=1

v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i

+
X
i
minfq

i
; v
d
i
 s
i
g

N
X
i=1
(v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i
) +
N
X
i=1
minfq

i
; v
0
g:
When G is neither yli or omplete, there exists by Lemma 6 an s 2 S suh that
the rst term on the right-hand side is > 0. Hene, the rst inequality in (27) must
hold. The proof for the seond inequality is similar.
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a) If min
i
q

i
 0, then 
A
(p

; q

; ) = 0 
P
i
min fq

i
; v
0
g, ontraditing (27).
b) If max
i
q

i
 v
0
, then 
A
(p

; q

; ) 
P
i
q

i
=
P
i
minfq

i
; v
0
g, ontraditing
(27).
) The inequality max
i
q

i
> v
0
follows from (b) above sine I
B
(p

; q

; ) = I implies

A
(p

; q

; ) = 0 and 0  
B
(p

; q

; ) =
P
i
q

i
. If v
d
i
  q

i
< v
0
for some i,
then any p suh that p
i
= v
0
  " and p
 i
= 0 for 0 < " < q

i
  v
d
i
+ v
0
would
indue buyer i to swith to A and hene is a protable deviation for seller A.
To see that v
D
> 2v
0
, note rst that min
i
(v
d
i
  q

i
)  v
0
in partiular implies
that max
i
q

i
 v
D
  v
0
. Hene, if v
D
 2v
0
, we have a ontradition to the rst
statement sine max
i
q

i
 v
D
  v
0
 v
0
. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that G is neither yli or omplete, and sup-
pose that seller B attrats all the buyers in an SPE (p

; q

; ) suh that q

1
=    =
q

N
. Then sine 
A
(p

; q

; ) = 0, Lemma 7(1) implies that q

1
=    = q

N
=
min
i
q

i
< 0. Then, however, 
B
(p

; q

; ) < 0, a ontradition. 
Proof of Proposition 9 It suÆes to show that (p

; q

) = (0; 0) oupled with
the following strategy prole  of the buyers is an SPE in eah lass of networks:
(p; q) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
(B; : : : ; B) if (p; q) = (p

; q

),

A
(p; q) if p = p

and q 6= q

,

B
(p; q) if p 6= p

and q q

.
In other words, all buyers hoose B under (p

; q

) = (0; 0), and when one of the
rms deviates to a non-zero prie vetor, the buyers oordinate on the NE whih is
least favorable to the deviating seller. In what follows, we show that seller A has no
inentive to deviate. A symmetri argument shows that seller B has no inentive to
deviate.
1) G is a yle.
Suppose that seller A deviates to p 6= p

. Let Q
k
be as dened in (5) under
(p; q

). Sine
I
A
((p; q

)) = [
K
k=1
Q
k
for some K  N , if 
i
(p; q

) = A, then i 2 Q
k
for some k  K. Reall that N
i
is
the set of neighbors of i in G, and that d
i
= jN
i
j = 2 sine G is yli. Let

k
i
=



N
i
\ [
k 1
`=1
Q
`



2 f0; 1; 2g
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denote the number of i's neighbors who have hosen A in rounds prior to k. If
i 2 Q
k
, then x
i
= A is a dominant ation in round k for buyer i so that
v

k
i
  p
i
> v
2 
k
i
, p
i
< v

k
i
  v
2 
k
i
: (28)
In partiular, buyer i is attrated by seller A in round 1 if p
i
< v
0
 v
2
, and attrated
by A in round k > 1 either if (i) p
i
< 0 and exatly one of his two neighbors has
already hosen A (
k
i
= 1), or (ii) p
i
< v
2
  v
0
and both his neighbors have already
hosen A (
k
i
= 2). Note also that only in round 1 does any buyer hoose A when
neither of his neighbors have already hosen A.
Seller A's payo under (p; q

; ) hene satises

A
(p; q

; ) =
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
p
i
< jQ
1
j(v
0
  v
2
) + (v
2
  v
0
)
K
X
k=2



fi 2 I n

[
k 1
`=1
Q
`

: 
k
i
= 2g



:
Sine no buyer hooses A in round k  2 if neither of his neighbors has already
hosen A, the number of omponents in G[[
k 1
`=1
Q
`
℄ is less than or equal to that in
G[Q
1
℄ for any k. It follows that
K
X
k=2
jfi 2 I n

[
k 1
`=1
Q
`

: 
k
i
= 2gj  jQ
1
j:
We an therefore onlude that 
A
(p; q

; )  0 and hene that p is not a protably
deviation.
2) G is omplete.
Dene Q
k
(k = 1; : : : ;K) as above. Sine G is omplete, for any buyer i, the
number 
k
i
of i's neighbors who have hosen A equals the number 
k
of buyers who
have hosen A in rounds 1; : : : ; k   1:

k
i
=



N
i
\ [
k 1
`=1
Q
`



=
k 1
X
`=1
jQ
`
j  
k
:
Furthermore, by Proposition 3, we only need onsider p suh that eah Q
k
ontains
a single buyer. (If Q
k
ontains two or more buyers, then sine G is omplete,
those buyers are adjaent.) Hene, without loss of generality, Q
k
= fkg for eah
k = 1; : : : ; N . For k = 1; : : : ;K, we also have
p
k
< v

k
  v
N 1 
k
:
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Seller A's payo under (p; q

; ) hene satises

A
(p; q

; ) =
N
X
k=1
N
X
k=1
p
k
<
K
X
k=1
 
v

k
  v
N 1 
k

: (29)
It is then straightforward to verify that the right-hand side equals zero. Hene,
seller A has no protable deviation.

Proof of Proposition 10. We will onstrut an SPE (p

; q

; ) in whih seller B
aptures all the buyers: I
B
((p

; q

)) = I. Let the buyer set be partitioned into I
1
and I
2
so that links exist only between I
1
and I
2
. Suppose without loss of generality
that
X
i2I
1
(v
d
i
  v
0
) 
X
i2I
2
(v
d
i
  v
0
)  0: (30)
Let
p

i
= q

i
=
8
<
:
v
d
i
  v
0
if i 2 I
1
,
v
0
  v
d
i
if i 2 I
2
,
and
(p; q) =
8
<
:

B
(p; q) if q = q

,

A
(p; q) otherwise.
By (30), seller B's payo under (p

; q

; ) is non-negative:

B
(p

; q

; ) =
X
i2I
q

i
 0:
By the denition of the B-maximal NE, if seller A deviates to p, then the set of
buyers he aptures equals I
A
((p; q

)) = [
K
k=1
Q
k
, where Q
k
is the set of buyers i
for whom x
i
= A is a stritly dominant strategy in round k under (p; q

) as dened
in (5).
Suppose rst that Q
1
 I
1
. we then have
X
i2Q
1
p
i
<
X
i2Q
1
minfv
0
  v
d
i
+ q

i
; v
0
g = 0:
Therefore, no p suh that K = 1 and Q
1
 I
1
under (p; q

) is protable. Sine
q

i
< 0 for i 2 I
2
, it is lear that no p suh that K = 1 under (p; q

) is protable
either.
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Suppose next that K = 2 and that Q
1
 I
1
. Then Q
2
\ I
1
= ; sine in round
2, every buyer i 2 Q
1
must be adjaent to some buyer in Q
1
 I
1
. (Otherwise, i
would have been in Q
1
.) It follows that q

i
< 0 for eah i 2 Q
2
, and hene that
X
i2Q
2
p
i
<
X
i2Q
2
min fv

2
i
  v
d
i
 
2
i
+ q

i
; v

2
i
g
=
X
i2Q
2

v

2
i
  v
d
i
 
2
i
  v
d
i
+ v
0

 0;
where 
2
i
= jN
i
\Q
1
j is the number of i's neighbors in Q
1
. Therefore, no deviation
p is protable if K = 2, Q
1
 I
1
and Q
2
 I
2
under (p; q

). It is then also lear that
no deviation p is protable if K = 2 and Q
2
 I
2
.
We next show that no deviation p is protable if K  2 and Q
k
\I
1
6= ; for some
k  2. Together with the above observations, this would imply that no deviation p
is protable if K = 2. Furthermore, if K  3, then it must be the ase that either
Q
2
\ I
1
6= ; or Q
3
\ I
1
6= ; sine G is bipartite, and sine every i 2 Q
3
is adjaent
to some buyer in Q
2
. It would hene follow that no deviation p is protable.
Let j 2 Q
k
\ I
1
for some k  2. Then

A
(p; q

; ) =
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
p
i
<
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
min
n
v

`
i
  v
d
i
 
`
i
+ q

i
; v

`
i
o

K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`

v

`
i
  v
d
i
 
`
i
+ q

i

+ v

k
j
 

v
d
j
  v
0
+ q
j

;
(31)
where

`
i
=



N
i
\

[
` 1
=1
Q





is the number of i's neighbors who have hosen A prior to round `. We now use
approximate linearity to evaluate the right-hand side of (31) term by term. First,
sine q

j
= v
d
j
  v
0
,
v

k
j
 

v
d
j
  v
0
+ q

j

  v
d
j
+ 2v
0
<  hd
j
+ 3": (32)
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Observe next that
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
n
v

`
i
  v
d
i
 
`
i
o
=
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
hn
v

`
i
  
`
i
h
o
 
n
v
d
i
 
`
i
  (d
i
  
`
i
)h
oi
 
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`

(d
i
  
`
i
)  
`
i

h
 2"


[
K
`=1
Q
`


  hm;
(33)
where
m = #links between [
K
`=1
Q
`
and I n
 
[
K
`=1
Q
`

.
Observe nally that
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
q

i
=
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
1
(v
d
i
  v
0
) 
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
2
(v
d
i
  v
0
)
=
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
1
(v
d
i
  v
0
  d
i
h) 
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
2
(v
d
i
  v
0
  d
i
h)
+ h
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
1
d
i
  h
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
2
d
i
:
(34)
Sine the externalities are "-lose to linear,
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
1
(v
d
i
  v
0
  d
i
h) 
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
2
(v
d
i
  v
0
  d
i
h)  2"


[
K
`=1
Q
`


: (35)
We also have
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
1
d
i
= #links between [
K
`=1
Q
`
\ I
1
and I
2
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
2
d
i
= #links between [
K
`=1
Q
`
\ I
2
and I
1
 #links between [
K
`=1
Q
`
\ I
2
and [
K
`=1
Q
`
\ I
1
34
so that
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
1
d
i
 
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
\I
2
d
i
 #links between [
K
`=1
Q
`
and I
2
n
 
[
K
`=1
Q
`

 #links between [
K
`=1
Q
`
and I n
 
[
K
`=1
Q
`

= m:
(36)
Substituting (35) and (36) into (34), we obtain
K
X
`=1
X
i2Q
`
q

i
 2"


[
K
`=1
Q
`


+ hm: (37)
Substituting (32), (33) and (37) into (31), we see that

A
(p; q

; ) < 2"


[
K
`=1
Q
`


  hm+ 2"


[
K
`=1
Q
`


+ hm  hd
j
+ 3"
= "
 
4


[
K
`=1
Q
`


+ 3

  hd
j
 " (4N + 3)  hd
j
:
Hene, if we set " = h= (4N + 3), then 
A
(p; q

; ) < 0 when " < ". 
Proof of Proposition 12. Let
Æ = max
s2S
N
X
i=1

v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i

:
When the externalities are "-lose to h-linear,
N
X
i=1

v
s
i
  v
d
i
 s
i

=
N
X
i=1
n
(v
s
i
  s
i
h) 

v
d
i
 s
i
  (d
i
  s
i
)h

  h ((d
i
  s
i
)  s
i
)
o
< 2N";
and hene
Æ < 2N": (38)
Sine G is separable, let (I
1
; I
2
) be the partition of the buyer set I, and let i
A
2 I
1
and i
B
2 I
2
be suh that
jN
i
A
\ I
1
j > jN
i
A
\ I
2
j and jN
i
B
\ I
2
j > jN
i
B
\ I
1
j.
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We speify (p

; q

; ) as follows:
(p

i
; q

i
) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
(Æ; Æ) if i = i
A
,
( Æ; Æ) if i = i
B
,
(0; 0) otherwise,
and
(p; q) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
(A; : : : ; A
| {z }
I
1
; B; : : : ; B
| {z }
I
2
) if (p; q) = (p

; q

),

B
(p; q) if p 6= p

,

A
(p; q) if p = p

and q 6= q

.
Note that 
A
(p

; q

; ) = 
B
(p

; q

; ) = Æ.
We rst show that the buyers' ation prole following (p

; q

) is a NE. If i 2
I
1
n fi
A
g, then x
i
= A is a best response sine
v
jN
i
\I
1
j
  p
i
= v
jN
i
\I
1
j
 v
jN
i
\I
2
j
= v
jN
i
\I
2
j
  q
i
:
If i = i
A
, then jN
i
\ I
1
j > jN
i
\ I
2
j so that
v
jN
i
\I
1
j
  v
jN
i
\I
2
j
=

v
jN
i
\I
1
j
  hjN
i
\ I
1
j

 

v
jN
i
\I
2
j
  hjN
i
\ I
2
j

+ h fjN
i
\ I
1
j   jN
i
\ I
2
jg
 h  2":
Hene, if we take
" =
h
2(2N + 1)
; (39)
then for any " < ", (38) implies that
v
jN
i
\I
1
j
  p
i
= v
jN
i
\I
1
j
  Æ > v
jN
i
\I
2
j
+ Æ = v
jN
i
\I
2
j
  q
i
:
The symmetri argument shows that x
i
= B is a best response for eah i 2 I
2
following (p

; q

).
We will next show that seller A has no protable deviation. Let p be any
deviation by seller A, and denote by Q
k
the set of buyers who will hoose A as an
iteratively dominant ation in round k under (p; q

) as dened in (5). Sine the
buyers play 
B
following (p; q

), buyer i will hoose A only if x
i
= A is iteratively
dominant: i 2 [
K
k=1
Q
k
. By Proposition 3, we may assume that no buyers in Q
k
are
adjaent.
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If i 2 Q
k
, then
p
i
< min fv

k
i
  v
d
i
 
k
i
+ q

i
; v

k
i
g  v

k
i
  v
d
i
 
k
i
+ q

i
;
where

k
i
=



N
i
\

[
k 1
=1
Q





is the number of i's neighbors who have hosen A prior to round k. Suppose rst
that [
K
k=1
Q
k
( I. Sine the externalities are "-lose to h-linear, we have
v

k
i
  v
d
i
 
k
i
=

v

k
i
  
k
i
h

 

v
d
i
 
k
i
  (d
i
  
k
i
)h

 

(d
i
  
k
i
)  
k
i

h
< 2"  

(d
i
  
k
i
)  
k
i

h:
Hene,

A
(p; q

; ) =
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
p
i

K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k

v

k
i
  v
d
i
 
k
i
+ q

i

<
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
n
2" 

(d
i
  
k
i
)  
k
i

h
o
+
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
q

i
= 2"


[
K
k=1
Q
k


  h
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k

(d
i
  
k
i
)  
k
i

+
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
q

i
:
Sine [
K
k=1
Q
k
( I by assumption and sine G is onneted,
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k

(d
i
  
k
i
)  
k
i

= #links between [
K
k=1
Q
k
and I n [
K
k=1
Q
k
 1:
It hene follows from (38) that

A
(p; q

; ) < 2"


[
K
k=1
Q
k


  h+ 2N" < 4N"  h;
whih is < 0 for " < " when " is given in (39).
Suppose next that [
K
k=1
Q
k
= I. In this ase,
P
K
k=1
P
i2Q
k
q

i
= 0. Hene the
denition of Æ implies that

A
(p; q

; ) =
K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k
p
i

K
X
k=1
X
i2Q
k

v

k
i
  v
d
i
 
k
i
+ q

i

 Æ = 
A
(p

; q

; ):
In either ase, hene, the deviation p is not protable. 
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Appendix II: Strong Equilibrium in the Buyers' Game
Our disussion in the text has plaed no restrition on the buyers' strategies other
than that implied by a Nash equilibrium. In this Appendix, we ask what happens
when the buyers atively oordinate their ations. While there an be many dierent
formulations of ation oordination, one simple and extreme way is to suppose that
any subset of the buyers may hoose a joint deviation whenever that yields eah
one of them a stritly higher payo than adhering to the proposed ation prole.
In other words, we will require that in eah subgame, the buyers' ation prole
onstitutes a strong Nash equilibrium.
9
We nd that the marginal ost priing is
not onsistent with a strong Nash equilibrium even if the network is omplete or
yli.
Formally, the buyers ation prole x

is a strong Nash equilibrium (strong NE)
if for any nonempty subset J  I of buyers, and for any x
J
,
u
i
(x

)  u
i
(x
J
; x

 J
) for some i 2 J . (40)
In other words, an ation prole is a strong NE if, whenever a oalition of buyers
ontemplate a joint deviation, there is a member in the oalition who annot stritly
benet from the deviation. If x

is a strong NE, then it is learly a NE. Note also
that x

is a strong NE if and only if (40) holds for any non-empty J  I and any
x
J
suh that x
j
6= x

j
for every j 2 J .
10
A strong NE x of the buyers' subgame is A-maximal if for any strong NE y,
y
i
= A implies x
i
= A, and B-maximal if y
i
= B implies x
i
= B. We an nd these
maximal strong NE using the iteration proedure similar to that used to nd the
A-maximal and B-maximal NE.
For any ation proles x and y, identify u
i
(x
;
; y) with u
i
(y). Let T
0
= ;, and
dene the subsets of buyers T
k
, P
k
, Q
k
, R
k
, Y
k
and Z
k
(n = 1; 2; : : :) reursively as
follows.
9
By the property of the payo funtions of the buyers' game, we an verify that any strong Nash
equilibrium is a oalition-proof Nash equilibrium in the sense of Bernheim et al. (1987).
10
To see this, suppose that x

is not a strong NE. Then there exist J 6= ; and x
J
suh that
u
j
(x

) < u
j
(x
J
; x

 J
) for every j 2 J . Then J
0
 fj 2 J : x
j
6= x

j
g 6= ;. Moreover,
u
j
(x
J
0
; x

 J
0) = u
j
(x
J
0
; x
JnJ
0
; x
 J
) = u
j
(x
J
; x

 J
) > u
j
(x

)
for every j 2 J
0
sine j 2 J n J
0
implies x
j
= x

j
. Hene, the oalition J
0
also has a protable joint
deviation suh that x
j
6= x

j
for every j 2 J
0
.
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For k = 0; 1; 2; : : :, dene Y
k+1
 I n T
k
to be the maximal set suh that
Y
k+1
=
n
i 2 I n T
k
:u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0
o
:
Y
k+1
is the set of buyers not in T
k
who, given x

T
k
, an olletively hoose A and
enjoy non-negative payos from it.
11
If there is no suh set, let Y
k+1
= ;. Likewise,
dene Z
k+1
 I n T
k
to be the maximal set suh that
Z
k+1
=
n
i 2 I n T
k
: u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Z
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
k
 Z
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0
o
:
If there is no suh set, then let Z
k+1
= ;. Let also R
k+1
be dened by
R
k+1
= (I n T
k
) n (Y
k+1
[ Z
k+1
) :
As before, R
k+1
is the set of buyers i for whom x
i
= ; is iteratively stritly dominant
given x

T
k
. Now dene P
k+1
 I n T
k
to be the maximal set suh that
P
k+1
=
n
i 2 I n T
k
: u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
P
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
k
 P
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

> u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

o
:
If there exists no suh set, then let P
k+1
= ;. P
k+1
is the set of buyers whose payos
from olletively hoosing x
i
= B are stritly higher than those from the maximal
oordination on A or from ;. Likewise, dene Q
k+1
 I n T
k
to be the maximal set
of buyers whose payos from olletively hoosing x
i
= A are stritly higher than
those from the maximal oordination on B or from ;:
Q
k+1
=
n
i 2 I n T
k
:u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Q
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Q
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

> u
i
 
x

T
k
; x
Z
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
k
 Z
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

o
:
Again, if there exists no suh set, then let Q
k+1
= ;.
1) If P
k+1
= Q
k+1
= R
k+1
= ;, then let k = K and stop.
2) Otherwise, let
T
k+1
= T
k
[ (P
k+1
[Q
k+1
[R
k+1
) ;
and
x

i
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
B if i 2 P
k+1
,
A if i 2 Q
k+1
,
; if i 2 R
k+1
.
11
With the possible dierene in T
k
and x
T
k
, hene, the denition of Y
k+1
is the same as in (2).
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If T
k+1
= I, then set K = k + 1 and stop. Otherwise, inrease k by one and start
over.
Given that the above proess starts over only when there is a buyer who has a
joint dominant ation, the maximal number of iteration K  N .
Proposition 14 Let x
A
and x
B
be dened by
x
A
= (x

T
K
; x
Y
K+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
K
 Y
K+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)); and
x
B
= (x

T
K
; x
Z
K+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
K
 Z
K+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)):
Then x
A
and x
B
are the A-maximal and B-maximal strong NE, respetively.
(p

; q

; ) is a strong SPE if for every (p; q), (p; q) is a strong NE of the buyers'
subgame, and 
A
(p

; q

; )  
A
(p; q

; ) and 
B
(p

; q

; )  
B
(p

; q; ) for every
p and q.
Proposition 15 Let a buyer network G be given and the externalities v = (v
0
; : : : ; v
D
)
satisfy (11). There exists no buyers' strategy prole  suh that for p

= q

= 0
(p

; q

; ) is a strong SPE.
Proof of Proposition 14. We show that x
A
is an A-maximal strong NE. The
symmetri argument shows that x
B
is a B-maximal strong NE. We begin by making
some preliminary observations as follows:
Lemma 16 a) u
i
(x
A
)  0 for every i.
b) For any k = 1; : : : ;K,
fi 2 I n T
k
: x
A
i
= Ag  Y
k+1
; and fi 2 I n T
k
: x
A
i
= Bg  Z
k+1
: (41)
) For any k, J  I n T
k
and x
J
, if u
i
(x
J
; x
A
 J
)  0 for every i 2 J , then
fi 2 J : x
i
= Ag  Y
k+1
and fi 2 J : x
i
= Bg  Z
k+1
: (42)
In partiular, for any y
 T
k
suh that u
i
(y
 T
k
; x
A
T
k
)  0 for every i 2 I n T
k
,
fi 2 I n T
k
: y
i
= Ag  Y
k+1
and fi 2 I n T
k
: y
i
= Bg  Z
k+1
: (43)
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Proof of Lemma 16. a) Suppose i 2 P
k+1
. Then
u
i
(x
A
) = u
i

x
A
T
k
; x
P
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
A
 T
k
 P
k+1

 u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
P
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
k
 P
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

> u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0;
where the last inequality holds trivially if i 2 (I n T
k
) n Y
k+1
and by the denition
of Y
k+1
if i 2 Y
k+1
. u
i
(x
A
)  0 holds also when i 2 Q
k+1
, R
k+1
or I n T
K
.
b) Let Y = fi 2 I n T
k
: x
A
i
= Ag. If Y 6 Y
k+1
, then
u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
Y [Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
Y
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
= (;; : : : ; ;)

= u
i
(x
A
)  0
for i 2 Y , and
u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
K[Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 K Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0
for i 2 Y
k+1
. This ontradits the maximality of Y
k+1
.
) Let Y = fi 2 J : x
i
= Ag. If Y 6 Y
k+1
, then
u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
Y [Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 Y  Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
J
; x
A
 J

 0
for every i 2 Y beause of (41), and
u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
Y [Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 Y Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 0
for every i 2 Y
k+1
. This ontradits the maximality of Y
k+1
. Hene (42) holds. (42)
implies (43) if we set J = I n T
k
. 
We now return to the proof of Proposition 14.
In what follows, denote by J the deviating oalition of buyers. We rst show
that x
A
is a strong NE by verifying (40) for eah hoie of J speied below.
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1) First take J suh that J \ T
1
6= ;.
If J \ P
1
6= ;, take i 2 J \ P
1
. Then x
A
i
= B by the denition of x
A
. If x
J
is
suh that x
i
= A and u
j
(x
J
; x
A
 J
)  0 for every j 2 J , then
u
i
(x
J
; x
A
 J
)  u
i
(x
Y
1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 Y
1
= (;; : : : ; ;))
< u
i
(x
P
1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 P
1
= (;; : : : ; ;))
 u
i
(x
A
);
where the rst inequality follows from (41) and (42). Likewise, (40) holds
for any J suh that J \ Q
1
6= ;. If J is suh that J \ R
1
6= ;, then take
i 2 J \ R
1
. By denition, x
A
i
= ;. If x
A
i
= A, then sine i =2 Y
1
, we have
u
i
(x
J
; x
A
 J
) < 0 = u
i
(x
A
). We also have u
i
(x
J
; x
A
 J
) < 0 = u
i
(x
A
) if x
i
= B
sine i =2 Z
1
.
2) As an indution hypothesis, suppose that (40) holds for any J suh that J \
T
k
6= ;.
Suppose that we take J suh that J \ T
k
= ; but J \ T
k+1
6= ;.
If J \ P
k+1
6= ;, take i 2 J \ P
k+1
. Then x
A
i
= B by the denition of x
A
. If
x
J
is suh that x
i
= A and u
j
(x
J
; x
A
 J
)  0 for every j 2 J , then
u
i
(x
J
; x
A
 J
) = u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
J
; x
A
 J T
k

 u
i
 
x
A
T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

< u
i
(x
A
T
k
; x
P
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
k
 P
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;))
 u
i
(x
A
);
where the seond line follows from (41) and (42). By the similar argument, (40)
holds for any J suh that J\Q
k+1
6= ;. If J\R
k+1
6= ;, take i 2 J\R
k+1
. Then
x
A
i
= ; by denition. If x
i
= A, then sine i =2 Y
k+1
, u
i
(x
J
; x
A
 J
) < 0 = u
i
(x
A
).
We also have u
i
(x
J
; x
A
 J
) < u
i
(x
A
) if x
i
= B sine i =2 Z
k+1
.
3) Finally, suppose that J  I n T
K
. Sine P
K+1
= ;, if x
J
= (B; : : : ; B), there
exists i 2 J suh that
u
i
(x
A
) = u
i
 
x
A
T
K
; x
Y
K+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
K
 Y
K+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
 
x
A
T
K
; x
J
= (B; : : : ; B); x
 T
K
 J
= (;; : : : ; ;)

= u
i
(x
J
= (B; : : : ; B); x
A
 J
);
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where the last equality holds beause x
A
i
6= B for any i 2 I n T
K
by denition.
Clearly, no other joint deviation x
J
by J yields a higher payo for i than
u
i
(x
J
= (B; : : : ; B); x
A
 J
). Hene, (40) holds for any J suh that J  I n T
K
.
We next show that the strong NE x
A
is A-maximal. Take any strong NE y.
Clearly, u
i
(y)  0 for every i 2 I. If i 2 P
1
, then y
i
= B: If y
i
6= B, then
u
i
(x
P
1
= (B; : : : ; B); y
 P
1
) > u
i
(x
Y
1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 Y
1
= (;; : : : ; ;))
 u
i
(y);
where the last inequality from (43) for k = 0. Hene, y violates (40). Likewise, we
an onlude that
y
i
=
8
<
:
A if i 2 Q
1
,
; if i 2 R
1
.
Hene, y
T
1
= x
A
T
1
. As an indution hypothesis, suppose that y
T
k
= x
A
T
k
. If i 2 P
k+1
then y
i
= B: If y
i
6= B, then
u
i
 
y
T
k
; x
P
k+1
= (B; : : : ; B); y
 T
k
 P
k+1

> u
i
 
y
T
k
; x
Y
k+1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
 T
k
 Y
k+1
= (;; : : : ; ;)

 u
i
(y
T
k
; y
 T
k
);
where the last inequality follows from (43) sine y
T
k
= x
A
T
k
by the indution hypoth-
esis. Hene, y violates (40). We also have
y
i
=
8
<
:
A if i 2 Q
k+1
,
; if i 2 R
k+1
.
Hene, y
T
k+1
= x
A
T
k+1
. Suppose nally that i 2 I n T
K
. Sine fi 2 I n T
K
:; y
i
=
Ag  Y
K+1
by (43), y
i
= A implies x
A
i
= A, showing that x
A
is A-maximal. 
Proof of Proposition 15. In view of Proposition 9, it suÆes to hek the exis-
tene of a strong NE when G is either yli or omplete.
1) G is a yle.
Suppose that for " > 0 small, p is given by
p
i
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:
v
1
  v
2
  " if i = 1, N   1,
 " if i = 2; : : : ; N   2,
v
2
  v
0
  " if i = N .
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We an then verify that under (p; q

), Q
1
= f1; : : : ; N   1g: For i = 1 and N   1,
u
i
(x
Q
1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
N
= ;) = v
1
  p
i
= v
2
+ "
> u
i
(x = (B; : : : ; B)) ;
and for i = 2; : : : ; N   2,
u
i
(x
Q
1
= (A; : : : ; A); x
N
= ;) = v
2
  p
i
= v
2
+ "
> u
i
(x = (B; : : : ; B)) ;
but for i = N ,
u
N
(x = (A; : : : ; A)) = v
2
  p
N
= v
0
+ "
< u
N
(x = (B; : : : ; B)) :
We an also verify that P
1
= R
1
= ;. Given T
1
= I n fNg, Q
2
= fNg:
u
N
(x
T
1
; x
N
= A) = v
2
  p
N
= v
0
+ " > u
N
(x
T
1
; x
N
= B):
Therefore, Q
1
[Q
2
= I and seller A's payo under (p; q

) equals

A
(p; q

; ) = 2(v
1
  v
2
  ") + v
2
  v
0
  " = 2v
1
  v
0
  v
2
  3";
whih is stritly positive if 2v
1
 v
0
 v
2
> 0 and " is suÆiently small. If 2v
1
 v
0
 
v
2
< 0, then we an verify that 
A
(p; q

; ) > 0 if we take " > 0 small and p suh
that
p
i
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:
v
2
  v
1
  " if i = 1, N   1,
 " if i = 2; : : : ; N   2,
v
0
  v
2
  " if i = N .
2) Suppose next that G is omplete.
Consider p suh that
p
i
=
8
<
:
v
N 2
  v
N 1
  " if i = 1; : : : ; N   1,
v
N 1
  v
0
  " if i = N .
44
Then Q
1
= f1; : : : ; N   1g and Q
2
= fNg, and

A
(p; q

; ) = (N   1)(v
N 2
  v
N 1
  ") + v
N 1
  v
0
  "
= (N   1)v
N 2
  (N   2)v
N 1
  v
0
 N";
whih is stritly positive if (N  1)v
N 2
  (N  2)v
N 1
 v
0
> 0 and " is suÆiently
small. If (N   1)v
N 2
  (N   2)v
N 1
  v
0
< 0, then 
A
(p; q

; ) > 0 if " > 0 is
small and p is given by
p
i
=
8
<
:
v
N 1
  v
N 2
  " if i = 1; : : : ; N   1,
v
0
  v
N 1
  " if i = N .
In either ase, hene, seller A an protably deviate from p

= 0 against q

= 0. 
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